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The growth of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) is often regarded as a solution to persistent 
unemployment in developing countries. Studies have shown that access to finance is the most serious obstacle to 
MSMEs’ growth. This paper investigates key obstacles to the growth of MSMEs in South Africa using the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys of 2003 and 2007. Two approaches are used to determine the key obstacles. The first improves on the 
simple count-of-ratings method used by many researchers. The second estimates the effects of obstacles on growth 
through sequential multivariate regressions based on the Growth Diagnostics framework by Hausmann, Rodrik & 
Velasco (2005) and identifies two levels of obstacles’ intensities: binding constraints with negative and significant effects 
and constraints with notable effects whose negative effects are significant but less than the binding. From both count- and 
regression-based analyses, access to finance is a relatively less important obstacle. The count-based analysis finds crime 
to be the top obstacle. In the regressions, ‘courts’, which refers to the efficacy of the legal system and thus related to 
crime, is binding. Electricity and transportation of goods are the constraints with notable effects. 
 
Introduction 
 
The World Development Report of 2013 (WDR, 2013) 
emphasises the role of the private sector in social and 
economic development. It submits that the availability of 
jobs, especially from the private sector, boosts living 
standards, raises productivity, and fosters social cohesion 
and contends that formal employment is “the principal way 
out of poverty” (WDR, 2013: 58). On average, 70 percent of 
jobs in developing countries are accounted for by MSMEs, 
making them an important part of the private sector. WDR 
(2013) further reveals that sub-Saharan Africa requires an 
annual job creation rate of 2.7 percent (the largest of all 
regions) to maintain an already worrisome employment to 
working-age ratio which has at least 40 percent of the 
employable population without jobs. It is thus imperative 
that obstacles to MSMEs’ growth be carefully studied in 
Africa. This paper is a modest contribution in that regard. 
Focusing on South Africa, the paper identifies, ranks and 
determines the most important obstacles to the job creation 
capacity of MSMEs.   
 
The paper builds on the Growth Diagnostics framework of 
Hausmann et al. (2005) and uses the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys of South Africa of 2003 and 2007. Growth 
Diagnostics is based on the premise that not all obstacles to 
growth are equally binding and that by determining and 
eliminating the most binding, optimal growth is realised 
even though other obstacles are still in place. In enterprise 
development research, the World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
data have been used to identify top and binding constraints. 
This is because the Enterprise Surveys have summarised the 
extensive list of obstacles in the literature to 15, making the 
data a reasonable starting point for investigating key 
constraints. In the Enterprise Surveys, firms report on 
whether each of the 15 obstacles is ‘not an obstacle’, a 
‘minor’, ‘moderate’, ‘major’ or a ‘very severe obstacle’ to 
their operations. Obstacles include employees’ skills 
adequacy, access to finance, electricity, crime and efficiency 
of the legal system amongst others.  
 
From the list, a pertinent question to ask is which obstacles, 
or better still which obstacle, must be prioritised given 
limited resources and the impracticality of tackling all at 
once? Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (2008), 
Dihn, Mavridis & Nguyen (2010), and to a lesser extent 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (2005), address the 
question and base their investigations on the Growth 
Diagnostics framework. Beck et al. (2005) use World 
Business Environment Surveys of 1999 to 2000 to 
investigate if the effects of access to finance, legal obstacles 
and corruption on growth are determined by firm size. They 
find that firms employing 5 to 50 workers are significantly 
affected by the three constraints.  
 
Ayyagari et al. (2008) also use World Business 
Environment Surveys. Unlike Beck et al. (2005), who begin 
their analysis with an a priori list of three obstacles, 
Ayyagari et al. (2008) use an artificial intelligence-based 
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) methodology to determine 
three obstacles affecting growth the most. They find access 
to finance, crime and political instability to be the top 
obstacles. The authors then determine the most binding 
using multivariate regression analysis. The top three 
obstacles enter the regression all at once along with firm and 
country variables as control. Finance is found to have the 
largest effect on growth and thus deemed binding.  
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Dihn et al. (2010) use the Enterprise Surveys of 2007 to 
2010, to identify top constraints by a count of responses of 
firms’ ratings of obstacles and find electricity, finance and 
tax rates as top obstacles. They determine the binding 
constraint through three sets of sequential regressions. The 
first set examines the independent effect of an obstacle on 
growth. In the second set, all obstacles enter the regression 
at once for each obstacle’s effects in the presence of other 
obstacles to be determined. In the final set, only obstacles 
significant in the second enter the regression. All regressions 
have intercept term, firm and country characteristics as 
control variables. Finance emerges as most binding.  
 
The foregoing three studies are cross-country. The first has 
54 countries from the developed and developing world, the 
second 80 from the same, while the third has 96 developing 
countries. Although all find finance binding, the top 
constraints vary. Two datasets from different periods made 
up of different countries can indeed be reasonably expected 
to yield different top constraints. But importantly, the 
difference suggests the distinctiveness of countries. Gelb, 
Ramachandran, Shah & Turner (2007) explore how 
obstacles vary in 27 African countries (including South 
Africa) using Enterprise Surveys. They determine the top 
obstacles for each country in two ways: firstly by a count of 
firms’ own subjective ratings of the obstacles, which the 
authors find differ considerably from country to country. 
Secondly, they estimate the effects of the obstacles using 
more objective indicators on growth, for example in the case 
of electricity, by substituting the rating of electricity with 
the actual number of power supply interruptions. They find 
that the effects of the objective measures of obstacles on 
growth vary with countries’ levels of per capita income.  
 
It may seem trivial to emphasise that obstacles differ by 
country. Yet, in the context of the cross-country enterprise 
development literature, to so emphasise is necessary due to 
the fact that the peculiarities of countries are smoothed-off in 
cross country studies such that resultant policy diagnoses are 
generic best suiting the average country. Country-specific 
studies become necessary to identify specific issues that can 
credibly inform policy. This paper demonstrates that policy 
recommendations drawn from a country-specific study can 
vary considerably from cross-country extrapolations. For 
instance, whereas studies of MSMEs in developing 
countries find access to finance as the top and binding 
constraint, this study finds the top constraint for all firms in 
South Africa to be crime, and the most binding for MSMEs 
to be the efficacy of the legal system i.e. courts. After 
grouping firms by size, age, sector, location and owner’s 
gender and ethnic origin it is clear that the intensity of 
constraints is not consistent but varies across the groups. 
Medium-sized enterprises are mildly affected by all 
obstacles reviewed, while small firms are collectively 
constrained by ‘courts’ and electricity. The study finds 
limited effects of obstacles on firms in Durban and Port 
Elizabeth1. Access to finance is only a significant constraint 
                                           
1 The World Bank Enterprise Surveys were conducted in four cities: Cape 
Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. Because the Durban and 
for small European-owned2 firms and small firms in Cape 
Town. The results affirm the view that a study of local 
circumstances identifies key obstacles with greater precision 
and engenders robust policy recommendations.  
 
MSME sector in South Africa 
 
Unemployment has been a perennial problem in South 
Africa. The enterprise development policy framed in 1995 
regards MSMEs as key to creating jobs and integrating the 
post-apartheid society (SA National Strategy, 1995). The 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) legislation post-2003 
has been an important strategy to implement the policy. The 
BEE legislation has a score card system with a total of 105 
points. Established organisations are to earn the points by 
spending at least 3 percent of their annual net profit after tax 
on the score card’s five elements. Of the five, two are 
closely associated with MSMEs: firstly, enterprise and 
supplier development with 40 points and socioeconomic 
development with 5 points. In essence, the BEE legislation 
has obliged all established entities to facilitate the growth of 
MSMEs. In most economies such expenditures would be 
voluntary corporate social investment. Given that it is 
otherwise in South Africa, it becomes quite important to 
identify key obstacles to growth and approximate the effects 
of such obstacles on growth so that the broad-based support 
from public, private and social economy actors can be 
informedly channelled. 
 
In investigating the key obstacles, researchers often present 
a list of possible obstacles for entrepreneurs to rate. A 
simple count of responses determines the top constraints. 
Dihn et al. (2010), Gelb et al. (2007) and Ayyagari, Beck & 
Demirguc-Kunt (2003) adopt this approach on Enterprise 
Survey data. The problem with the approach is that the firms 
will only be responding to a specific obstacle and rating 
only that obstacle but not ranking the obstacle against 14 
others. To address this weakness within the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey instrument, this paper uses responses to 
the question “among the issues numbered 1 to 15, please 
indicate which one constitutes: the most serious obstacle; 
the second most serious obstacle; the third most serious 
obstacle”.  A score of 3 is assigned to the first most serious 
constraint, 2 to the second and 1 to the third most serious. 
Multiplying the score by the observed frequencies and 
summing the product of the first, second and third most 
serious obstacle for each firm, the relative importance of 
each of the 15 obstacles is determined by ranking the 
obstacles. The results for all firms are graphed in Figure 1 
against results from a simple count of ratings above a 
‘moderate’ rating. In both, crime is the top obstacle followed 
by electricity. Access to finance is the fourth on the simple 
count method but fifth in the alternative approach, while 
worker education becomes the fourth most important from 
being seventh in the simple count approach.  
                                                                       
Port Elizabeth samples are smaller we combined the two under ‘Durban and 
Port Elizabeth’. 
2 The World Bank Enterprise Surveys in South Africa list six ethnic groups 
for business owners: African, European, Indian, Lebanese or Middle 
Eastern, Other Asian and Other. We aggregate the last five under ‘Asian’. 
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Figure 1: Rating of constraints by firms in South Africa 
 
Source: Authors' estimations based on World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
 
Table 1 reports the top 5 obstacles by firm size. Crime is the 
top obstacle across all firm sizes. Access to finance only 
appears as a second top obstacle for micro enterprises. 
 
Table 1: Relative weights (%) of top 5 obstacles faced by 
MSMEs in South Africa 
 
Constraint Size of enterprise 
Rank Name of 
constraint 
Micro Small Medium MSME
s 
1 Crime  17.61 29.90 30.91 28.49 
2 Electricity 9.58 13.75 11.69 12.25 
3 Corruption  10.36 11.74 10.45 
4 Access to 
finance 
14.93 10.11  9.44 
5 Practices of 
competitors in 
the informal 
sector 
10.70 9.57  7.81 
- Inadequate 
education 
  11.05  
- Labour 
regulations 
  7.38  
- Transportation 10.00    
 Total weight 
of the 5 key 
constraints 
62.82 73.69 72.76 68.44 
 
Source:  Authors' estimations based on World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
 
Figure 2 compares some of the top obstacles in South Africa 
reported in Figure 1 to the top obstacles of the  96 
developing economies in Dihn et al. (2010).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Top constraints reported by enterprises – 
South Africa versus the World 
 
Source: Dihn et al. (2010: 10); World Bank Enterprise 
Survey of South Africa (2007) 
 
The difference captured by Figure 2 suggests the 
unsuitability in South Africa of MSME development 
policies drawn from cross-country studies. In any case, for 
stakeholders set on promoting MSMEs, it is the top 
domestic constraints that matter and, better still, the most 
binding. Before determining the most binding constraint, the 
next section reviews the Growth Diagnostic framework 
upon which the study is based. 
 
Analytical framework and data sources 
 
Analytical framework 
 
Hausmann et al. (2005) provide a theoretical framework, 
Growth Diagnostics, to determine a binding constraint. Two 
arguments are implicit in the framework. The first is that for 
developing countries to improve their citizens’ living 
standards, economic growth is what is required the most. 
The second is that economic growth is always context-
dependent varying from setting to setting. The framework is 
based on the observation that in any setting, obstacles to 
growth will not constrain equally, i.e. some obstacles will 
have a greater effect than others but one, the binding 
constraint, will have the largest effect on growth. It is that 
binding constraint that keeps growth in check. Should the 
binding constraint be identified and eliminated, a welfare-
improving equilibrium emerges in that setting. The 
challenge is then twofold: identifying the binding constraint, 
and designing policies to eliminate it. 
 
How then does one “sift through what may seem like a 
bewildering array of problems to hone in on the most likely 
culprits for growth failures through a combination of simple 
theory and suggestive empirics”? (Rodrik, 2010: 35). The 
framework is not prescriptive. Dihn et al. (2010) and 
Ayyagari et al. (2008) use different approaches to determine 
the top constraints: the former use a count of responses 
complemented by regression analysis, and the latter, DAG 
methodology. Once sifted, both use regression analysis to 
determine the top constraint with the largest effect on 
growth.  
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It is indeed expedient to identify the most binding problem 
in a setting because policies can be specific in design and 
execution. But there are many reasons to be cautious in 
ebulliently adopting a framework that singles just one 
impediment in a bewildering array of many. Three reasons 
need particular mention. Firstly, the framework’s underlying 
assertion that in any setting only one constraint matters most 
is very restrictive. It implicitly assumes homogeneity of 
subjects in that setting and that the effects of the binding 
constraint will be about the same across all. Secondly, as 
Ayyagari et al. (2008) find, some effects of obstacles on 
growth can be indirect such that it is possible that a 
seemingly minor obstacle is responsible for what the 
framework diagnoses as binding. In such a situation, it is 
reasonable to posit that tackling the binding constraint as 
defined by the framework will not improve growth. Thirdly, 
it can be impractical for policy to attend to some binding 
constraint because of limited resources or because the 
constraint can only be eliminated over time. Crime, 
corruption, informality of the economy and political 
instability are examples. In all three reasons for caution, a 
pragmatic approach is probably to take note of constraints 
whose effects are most close to that of the binding 
constraint. The problem is that once the binding constraint is 
determined no attention appears to be given to what would 
have been discarded in the sifting process. This paper 
attempts to retain the framework’s holistic analysis of 
constraints right through to the results by not quickly 
discarding obstacles in the sifting process. This ensures that 
the interpretation of the results from the frameworks is not 
solely focused on the binding impediment but other serious 
challenges as well.  
 
As background to the analysis, it is important to refer to a 
study by Rodrik (2008) which sought to understand why 
unemployment has remained high in South Africa. 
Reviewing the economy over three decades, Rodrik (2008) 
finds that unemployment is largely explained by the 
increasing capital intensity of the manufacturing and mining 
sector along with a growing financial sector, all of which 
shored up demand for highly skilled workers while job 
opportunities for the less skilled waned. Rodrik (2008) 
shows that it is less likely that jobs will be created by large 
firms as has been the case in the past. Instead, for job 
creation, policies must promote new sectors and 
entrepreneurship. This affirms the need to understand 
obstacles to the growth of emerging enterprises. 
 
Application of analytical framework 
 
Many studies have shown that MSME growth is 
considerably explained by firm age (Haltiwanger, Jarmin & 
Miranda, 2013), the sector in which it operates (Soderbom 
& Teal, 2003), ownership structure such as ethnic origins 
and gender of owners (Kantor, 2005; Raturi & Swamy, 
1999) and location (Gelb et al. 2007; Aterido & Hallward-
Driemeier, 2010). On the back of this literature, it is fair to 
expect that the effect of an obstacle on growth will likewise 
vary across the categories of MSME such as age, sector, 
ownership, and location in South Africa. Accordingly, the 
analytical framework groups firms in the said categories. 
Categorising firms in this manner is also useful as policy 
makers often direct support to specific groups.  
 
In this paper, growth is defined as the log difference 
between the number of full-time employees in the period 
prior to the survey, 2003, and the time the survey was done 
in 2007: 
 
        
                  
 
 
 
where          is the growth of firm i at time t,        is 
the number of its full-time employees in 2007,          in 
2003 and N is the number of years between the two periods.  
Alternatively, growth can be similarly based on sales. 
 
The analysis seeks to determine the binding constraints and 
constraints with notable effects and this is done using two 
approaches. The first approach is through four sequential 
stages while the second explores the effects of the obstacles 
using a model with interaction terms. 
 
The first approach 
 
The effects of an individual obstacle on growth are first 
observed using the following model. 
 
Model 1: 
 
                            
                     
                           
 
Firm characteristics include 2006 sales, the number of full-
time paid employees in 2003, the square of the number of 
full-time paid employees at the end of 2006, firm age, the 
square of firm age, a dummy for whether firm is a 
subsidiary, and a dummy variable for foreign ownership of 
firm that is above 10%. Market characteristics include a 
dummy for direct exports above 10% of sales and a dummy 
for manufacturing sector. Overall, the  control variables are 
such that the results of this paper are comparable to similar 
studies.  
 
The analysis proceeds to observe the impact of all obstacles 
on growth at once in Model 2. 
 
Model 2: 
 
                                                
                            
 
In the third stage, the significant obstacles from Model 1 and 
2 are used.  
 
Model 3: 
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The second approach 
 
In the second approach, interactions between some of the 
groups are allowed and the top constraints are determined by 
estimating the following regression. 
 
Model 4: 
 
                                        
                      
                            
 
where the interaction term is each of the 15 obstacles 
interacting with the small and with the medium firms in 
turns. Results from the three earlier stages compel us to drop 
micro enterprises from the interactions because of the 
relatively small sample. 
 
A similar analysis is run in parallel, where instead of 
employment growth, sales growth is used. Those results are 
not presented but reference to them is made when discussing 
results of the models above.  
 
Decision criteria  
 
Results are summarised in Tables 4 to 6. For the key 
question (i.e. what is the binding constraint for the growth of 
MSMEs in South Africa?), three possible outcomes are 
expected from the methodology outlined. One outcome is a 
binding constraint for each category of firms in Model 3. 
The binding constraint must have a significant negative 
effect on growth. An obstacle can be deemed binding in 
Model 3 subject to the criterion given in B. below. The two 
other likely outcomes occur in the absence of a binding 
constraint. One would be when there is evidence that the 
effect of an obstacle on growth is negative and significant in 
Model 1 and 2. Such an outcome will be referred to as a 
constraint with notable effects. Another likely outcome will 
be when there is insufficient evidence that any of the 
constraints impacts growth in a meaningful way. On such 
outcomes no further investigations are done but the possible 
implications are discussed. In sum then, the analysis and 
decision-making criteria on what is a binding constraint or a 
constraint with notable effect is as follows: 
 
The first approach 
 
A. With reference to Model 1, the outcome is a constraint 
with notable effects if, in the respective category of 
enterprises, it is the only constraint with a significant 
negative impact on growth given that none other(s) 
emerges significant in Model 2. 
B. With reference to Model 2, the outcome is a binding 
constraint if it is significant and is the only constraint 
that is significant given that no other constraint was 
found significant in Model 1. If one or more constraints 
are significant in Model 2 or, in addition, at least one or 
more from Model 1, then the binding constraint is 
determined by proceeding with all such significant 
constraints from Models 1 and 2 to Model 3. 
C. With reference to Model 3, the outcome is a binding 
constraint if significant. Should more than one emerge 
significant then the constraint with the largest marginal 
effect on growth will be deemed the most binding and 
the other significant ones, constraints with notable 
effects. 
D. There is no reporting on categories of firms where 
constraints have a less than notable effect on growth. 
The second approach 
 
E. With reference to Model 4, the constraint with the most 
effect is determined by counting the number of times a 
constraint has a significant negative effect on the 
interaction terms. The group or category of firms most 
affected by an obstacle is also determined by a count of 
obstacles negatively affecting the group significantly. .  
Data  
 
The analysis uses data from two World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys3 conducted in South Africa in 2003 and 2007. Both 
were conducted in Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and 
Port Elizabeth. In 2007, 1,057 enterprises were surveyed: 
120 micro, 375 small, 366 medium and 196 large. All micro 
enterprises surveyed were in Johannesburg. In 2003, 603 
firms were covered of which 191 were also surveyed in 
2007 and are included in the 1,057 firms of 2007. It is the 
matched set of 191 enterprises which the study utilises to 
track the importance of access to finance over time as it 
emerges that finance is a relatively less important obstacle. 
The importance of finance is also tracked by comparing the 
unmatched sample of 412 enterprises in 2003 to 866 
enterprises in 2007. Except when exploring the importance 
of access to finance over time, the paper uses the 2007 
survey data only.  
 
In the Enterprise Surveys, firms rate 15 obstacles on a scale 
of 0 to 4 where 0 is no obstacle, 1 is minor, 2 moderate, 3 
major, and 4 very severe. The obstacles are access to 
finance, access to land, business licensing and permits, 
corruption, courts, crime, customs and trade regulations, 
electricity, inadequately educated workers, labour 
regulations, political instability, practices of informal sector 
competitors, tax administration, tax rates, and transportation 
of goods and supplies.  
 
Since the measures of the 15 constraints are categorical, 
there are three alternative approaches of handling them in 
the analysis. One would be to capture the categorical 
measures as they are, which would make interpretation and 
comprehension of results convolutedly confusing given the 
five categories. Another would be to reduce the number of 
categories to for instance two, where one is ‘no obstacle’ 
and the other is ‘obstacle’. Interpreting results from the two 
                                           
3 Enterprise Surveys were launched in 2002 to gather firm-level data in 
developing economies using a uniform survey instrument and sampling 
method. A description of the survey instrument and sampling methodology 
is outlined in Kuntchev, Ramalho, Rodriguez-Meza & Yang (2012). Many 
researchers have used the Survey data to compare private sector 
development issues across countries but few solely focus on one country. 
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categories would be straightforward but at the loss of 
information in the ordered categorical ratings. The third 
alternative is to treat the categories as weak proxies of an 
otherwise continuous variable and use the resultant mean. 
The third alternative, which this paper uses, is adopted by 
Beck et al. (2005) and Dihn et al. (2010).  
 
Descriptive statistics for the obstacles are reported in Table 
3. Table 2 reports summary statistics of the 861 MSMEs by 
age, sector, ownership, and location. Like Dihn et al. (2010), 
an employment-based measure of growth is used as opposed 
to the sales-based measure as the latter is more volatile.  
 
 
Table 2: Employment growth rates by enterprise category 
 
Category  Obs. Mean   Std. Dev. Min Max 
 All 883 0.0761 0.1047 -0.7068 0.5973 
 Large firms 193 0.0611 0.1053 -0.7068 0.4176 
 MSMEs 690 0.0803 0.1042 -0.2310 0.5973 
Size Micro 68 0.0216 0.1104 -0.2310 0.4621 
Small 281 0.0936 0.1090 -0.1959 0.5973 
Medium 341 0.0811 0.0947 -0.2310 0.4851 
Age Young 147 0.0960 0.1076 -0.2310 0.3662 
Mature 304 0.0854 0.1093 -0.2310 0.5973 
Old 239 0.0642 0.0930 -0.2310 0.4176 
Sector Retail 171 0.0646 0.1053 -0.2310 0.5973 
Services 156 0.0759 0.1034 -0.1865 0.5365 
Manufacturing 361 0.0892 0.1032 -0.2310 0.4851 
Region Cape Town 96 0.0712 0.1057 -0.2310 0.3662 
Durban-Port Elizabeth 135 0.1107 0.0958 -0.0278 0.5365 
Johannesburg 391 0.0823 0.1013 -0.1959 0.5973 
Ownership African 234 0.0858 0.1128 -0.2310 0.4851 
Asian & other 188 0.0808 0.1048 -0.2310 0.5973 
European  268 0.0752 0.0957 -0.2310 0.5365 
Female 149 0.0756 0.1083 -0.1865 0.5365 
Male 530 0.0812 0.1034 -0.2310 0.5973 
 
Source:  Authors' estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
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Table 3: Variables descriptions and summary statistics 
 
Variable Description Obs. Min Max Mean SD 
Micro  Number of employees 120 1 4 2.2833 1.2243 
Small  Number of employees 375 5 20 10.0930 4.4950 
Medium Number of employees 366 21 99 41.9290 21.6650 
Large Number of employees 196 100 96
00 
426.4850 979.344 
Firm age 2006 minus the year firm begun operating in South Africa 1056 1 14
1 
15.9290 17.7736 
Young Up to 5 years 325 1 5 2.8369 1.5359 
Mature Between 6 and 15 years 360 6 15 9.5278 2.8105 
Old Above 15 years 370 16 14
1 
33.6092 19.6763 
Experience How many years of experience working in this sector does the top manager 
have? 
1056 1 61 13.7311 10.7040 
Gender  Dummy for female ownership 847 0 1 0.2361 0.4250 
Access to 
finance 
How much of an obstacle access to and cost of finance is an to the firm’s 
operations 
860 0 4 0.8826 1.2569 
Access to land How much of an obstacle access to land is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.5884 1.0877 
Licensing  How much of an obstacle business licencing/permits are issues to the firm’s 
operations 
860 0 4 0.4349 0.8814 
Corruption How much of an obstacle corruption is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.9570 1.2393 
Courts How much of an obstacle functioning of courts are to the firm’s operations 860 0 4  0.1953 0.5921 
Crime How much of an obstacle crime, theft and disorder is the firm’s operations 860 0 4  1.9547 1.2817 
Customs & 
trade  
How much of an obstacle customs and trade regulations are to the firm’s 
operations 
860 0 4  0.2105 0.6281 
Electricity How much of an obstacle electricity is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4  1.1395 1.3273 
Inadequately 
educ  
How much of an obstacle inadequately educated workers are to the firm’s 
operations 
860 0 4  0.6349 1.0025 
Labour 
regulations 
How much of an obstacle labour regulations are to the firm’s operations 860 0 4  0.5058 0.9098 
Political 
instability 
How much of an obstacle political instability presents is to the firm’s 
operations 
860 0 4  0.2733 0.7180 
Informal sector How much of an obstacle are practices of informal competitors to the firm’s 
operations 
859 0 4  0.8312 1.1356 
Tax 
administration 
How much of an obstacle tax administration is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4  0.2593 0.6868 
Tax rates How much of an obstacle tax rates are to the firm’s operations 859 0 4  0.4144 0.8518 
Transportation How much of an obstacle is transportation of goods and services  to the firm’s 
operations 
860 0 4  0.5163 0.9399 
 
sales_06 Sales in 2006 859 7,200 328,000,000 10,300,000 25,700,000 
emp_03 Number of employees in 2003 694 0 150 20.9798 21.7520 
lab_sqd Square of the number of full-time paid employees at the end of 2006  859 1 14400 1,003 1,858 
age_sqd Square of firm age  859 1 4,060,225 5,076 138,525 
part_of Dummy for being part of a group of firms  856 0 1 0.2570 0.4372 
own_foreign Dummy for ownership above 10 percent  859 0 1 0.0873 0.2825 
Export Dummy for direct exports above 10 percent  859 0 1 0.0477 0.2133 
 
Source: Authors' estimations based on the World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
 
Empirical results on binding constraints to 
growth 
 
Table 4 summarises the results of the first approach, Models 
1 to 3. The marginal effects of the binding constraints are 
presented in Table 5. These results are discussed next 
followed by a discussion of the results of Model 4, the 
second approach. 
 
The binding constraints: first approach 
 
Except for small firms of European ownership or in Cape 
Town, the results show that access to finance does not 
impact the growth of all other MSMEs significantly. The 
effects of access to finance on the sales-based growth 
measure are not significant for all MSMEs. The relative 
insignificance of access to finance is discussed later in the 
paper. The analysis does not find a binding constraint in the 
full sample of firms that includes 196 large enterprises. 
When the large firms are dropped from the analysis so 
leaving 861 MSMEs, some significant growth obstacles 
emerge. Excluding large firms also improves the quality of 
results with adjusted R-squared improving from an average 
of 4 percent for all firms on the 15 individual regressions of 
Model 2 to 78 percent for micro enterprises. 
 
Of the 17 enterprise subgroups studied in the 5 categories of 
Table 2, it is in the full sample of MSMEs, the medium, 
young and male-owned firms that the search for a binding 
constraint progressed to Model 3. For the four categories, 
‘courts’ is the binding constraint. For young firms, the 
regressions of individual obstacles of Model 1 find only 
courts significant. However when all constraints enter the 
regression at once, practices of competitors in the informal 
sector emerge as the only significant problem. Additionally, 
the parallel analysis based on sales growth finds tax 
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administration significant when all constraints enter the 
regression at once: it is the only significant outcome from all 
the sales growth-based regressions. With three constraints 
for young firms, the analysis proceeds to Model 3, entering 
only courts and practices of competitors in the informal 
sector in the regression. Courts emerge as significant. Given 
that ignoring tax administration which was significant in the 
sales growth-based regression may justifiably communicate 
some incompleteness of the analysis, the study explores 
what emerges when the three constraints are regressed at 
once on the employment-based growth measure first and 
then on sales-based growth measure. On the employment-
based growth, only courts is significant. On the sales-based 
measure, courts and practices of the informal sector are 
significant but tax administration presents no meaningful 
effect.  With reference to the average marginal effects the 
binding constraint for young MSMEs is therefore the 
efficacy of the judicial system i.e. courts.   
 
All else held constant, there is basis from this study to say 
that the efficacy of the legal system reduces the propensity 
of young firms to create an additional job by, on average, 
2.83 percent in South Africa (see the average marginal 
effects in Table 5). African-owned firms have the highest 
growth rates and for them, tax administration is binding 
reducing the likelihood of an additional job being created by 
3.13 percent. MSMEs in the retail sector have ‘business 
licensing and permits’ as their most binding constraint. 
Practices of competitors in the informal sector are the most 
binding constraint for enterprises owned by those of Asian 
origin. Enterprises in Johannesburg are affected by 
electricity supply problems the most. For MSMEs as a 
whole, ‘courts’ is binding and transport and electricity are 
constraints with notable effects. But thus far, the analysis 
has not found a notable constraint for micro, small, mature, 
old, European- and female-owned enterprises and firms 
based in Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth. Interesting 
results emerge from the second approach, Model 4.  
 
The binding constraints: second approach 
 
Ideally, interactions would include all five enterprise groups 
(by size, age, sector, location, gender and ethnic origin) and 
the subgroups. However, a sample of 861 is too small to be 
spread across all possible combinations. The analysis 
designates firm size as the reference category which is then 
interacted with each of the other categories’ subgroups. 
Micro enterprises are largely homogenous: all are from one 
locality, 80 percent are African-owned and three-quarters 
are retailers. Interacting micro enterprises with other groups 
would yield limited observations and meaning. Micro 
enterprises are therefore dropped in all interactions. The 
results of the interaction model are reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 reports the effects of each obstacle when it interacts 
with small or with medium firms and one of the subgroups 
(i.e. young, old, services, etc.). Table 6 can be read either 
horizontally along the rows or vertically along the columns. 
Overall, across all categories of firms such as Young, 
Mature, Old, etc., the obstacles tend to have negative effects 
on small businesses than medium-sized businesses. Of all 
the obstacles, Crime, Transport, Electricity and Competition 
in the informal sector, in that order, are the obstacles with 
the most significant negative effect across the categories of 
small scale businesses. Other obstacles with significant 
negative effects include Customs regulation, Workers’ 
education, Corruption and Court. The three obstacles with 
the least negative effect are Access to land, Access to 
Finance and Tax administration. For instance, by looking at 
access to finance across the category of firms, it can be seen 
that the obstacle is significant in 2 of the 14 interactions (i.e. 
European-owned and Cape Town-based small firms). 
Interestingly, the effect of access to finance is negative for 
all small firms except the African-owned.  
 
Reading the results along the columns, i.e. vertically, the 
effects of all obstacles on each of the categories of firms can 
be seen. For example, the first column of Table 6 shows the 
effects of each obstacle on young small firms where only 
‘practices of competitors in the informal sector’ is 
significant. For small firms in Durban and Port Elizabeth, all 
15 obstacles have no significant effect on growth. One of the 
many plausible explanations is that the survey instrument 
may not have picked up key issues affecting growth in those 
areas. On the other hand, 9 of the 15 obstacles have 
significant negative effect on the retail, Asian-owned and 
Johannesburg-based small firms. For Johannesburg-based 
small firms, the obstacles that have the most significant 
negative effect (at 1% level of significance) are Crime, 
Customs regulations, Electricity, and Competition in 
informal sector. These were closely followed by Corruption, 
Workers’ education and Transport which were significant at 
5% level of significance. Notably,  male-owned small firms 
are significantly affected by 8 out of the 15 obstacles while 
only 3 are significant for female-owned small firms despite 
the fact that many studies have shown that female-owned 
firms face more obstacles. Further research would help to 
explain these differences.  
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Table 4: Obstacles that constrain MSMEs’ growth the most in South Africa 
 
  Summary 
Firms’ categories Courts Customs 
and trade 
regulations 
Electricity Business 
licensing 
and 
permits 
Practices of 
informal 
sector 
competitors 
 
Tax 
admin 
Tax 
rates 
Transport Constraints 
with notable 
effect 
Most binding 
constraint 
ALL   -0.007       Electricity 
   (0.021)*        
MSMEs -0.012  -0.006     -0.010 Electricity Courts 
 (0.037)*  (0.036)*     (0.023)* Transport  
Size Micro         - - 
 Small      -0.014   - - 
       0.092     
 Medium -0.009  -0.006      Electricity Courts 
  (0.055)  (0.033)*        
Age Young -0.028    
-0.023 
  
-0.019 
Informal 
competition 
Courts 
  (0.031)*    0.012   (0.052)   
 Mature  -0.025 -0.009      - - 
   (0.053) (0.067)        
 Old         - - 
Sector Retail    -0.022    -0.017 Transport Licensing 
     (0.039)*    (0.085)   
 Services   -0.011      - - 
    (0.076)        
 Manuf.        -0.009 - - 
         (0.096)   
Region Cape 
Town 
        - - 
 Durban-
PE 
        - - 
 Jo’burg   -0.007       Electricity 
    (0.045)*        
Owner Female         - - 
 Male -0.011  -0.007     -0.009  Courts 
  (0.074)  (0.039)*     (0.049)*   
 African      -0.031    Tax admin. 
       (0.025)*     
 Asian     -0.018    - Informal 
competition 
      (0.012)*      
 European -0.013      -0.013  - - 
  (0.063)      (0.090)    
P-values in parentheses; * significant at the 5 percent level 
Source: Authors' estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
 
Table 5: Marginal effects of the binding constraints 
 
Average marginal effects      
Model VCE : OLS       
Expression : Linear prediction, predict ()       
dy/dx w.r.t. : binding constraint       
 Delta method 
Enterprise group Binding constraint dy/dx Std. Err. z P>ǀ z ǀ      [95% Conf. Interval] 
ALL Electricityᶾ -0.0069 0.0030 -2.3100 0.0210 -0.0127 -0.0010 
Johannesburg MSMEs Electricityᶾ -0.0074 0.0037 -2.0100 0.0440 -0.0147 -0.0002 
All MSMEs Courts♪ -0.0118 0.0057 -2.0900 0.0360 -0.0229 -0.0008 
Medium  Courts♪ -0.0085 0.0044 -1.9300 0.0540 -0.0172 0.0001 
Young Courts♪ -0.0283 0.0130 -2.1900 0.0290 -0.0537 -0.0029 
Male-owned Courts♪ -0.0114 0.0064 -1.7900 0.0730 -0.0238 0.0011 
African-owned Tax administrationᶾ -0.0313 0.0138 -2.2600 0.0240 -0.0585 -0.0042 
Asian-owned Practices of informal sector competitorsᶾ -0.0183 0.0072 -2.5400 0.0110 -0.0324 -0.0042 
Retail Business licensing and permitsᶾ -0.0216 0.0104 -2.0800 0.0370 -0.0419 -0.0013 
ᶾ Marginal effect estimated at Model 3 stage where all obstacles enter the regression at once 
♪ Marginal effect estimated post model 4 where only significant obstacles from Models 2 and 3 enter the regression 
 
Source:  Authors' estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
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Table 6: Interaction for each obstacle 
 
 Young Mature Old Retail Services Manufacturing 
 Small Mediu
m 
Small Mediu
m 
Small Mediu
m 
Small Mediu
m 
Small Mediu
m 
Small Mediu
m 
Access to finance -0.010 0.015 -0.005 0.015 -0.011 0.006 -0.012 0.024 -0.012 0.007 -0.006 0.012 
 0.154 0.106 0.408 0.007 0.154 0.371 0.226 0.043 0.153 0.343 0.191 0.014 
Access to land -0.011 0.011 -0.002 0.018 0.007 0.010 -0.011 0.012 -0.023 0.007 0.008 0.018 
 0.177 0.378 0.792 0.003 0.430 0.132 0.315 0.207 0.039* 0.330 0.242 0.002 
Licensing & 
permits 
-0.002 0.023 
-0.005 0.015 -0.009 0.003 
-0.031 0.015 
0.003 0.018 -0.001 0.009 
 0.892 0.070 0.585 0.079 0.426 0.809 0.023* 0.361 0.835 0.122 0.947 0.265 
Corruption -0.007 0.018 -0.003 0.010 -0.017 0.002 -0.012 0.011 -0.019 0.002 -0.002 0.010 
 0.266 0.037 0.530 0.034 0.012* 0.631 0.066 0.087 0.015* 0.730 0.661 0.024 
Courts -0.036 -0.026 -0.025 -0.002 -0.031 0.002 -0.056 0.001 -0.030 -0.011 -0.017 0.000 
 0.273 0.104 0.151 0.854 0.042* 0.850 0.017* 0.953 0.139 0.322 0.251 0.983 
Crime -0.006 0.013 -0.010 0.008 -0.012 0.002 -0.013 0.004 -0.017 0.002 -0.002 0.012 
 0.164 0.012 0.007*
* 0.022 
0.008*
* 0.632 
0.001**
* 
0.359 0.000**
* 0.589 0.681 0.000 
Customs 
regulations 
-0.014 -0.023 
-0.041 0.007 -0.030 0.013 
-0.019 0.025 
-0.051 0.009 -0.026 0.002 
 0.304 0.217 
0.017* 0.579 0.092 0.103 
0.277 0.099 
0.073 0.527 
0.026
* 0.773 
Electricity -0.005 -0.001 -0.015 0.004 -0.015 0.003 -0.024 0.001 -0.018 0.002 -0.007 0.005 
 0.428 0.944 0.002*
* 0.422 0.011* 0.482 
0.017* 0.878 
0.001** 0.705 0.106 0.199 
Workers’ education -0.005 0.003 -0.011 0.013 -0.030 0.005 -0.036 0.007 -0.031 0.003 -0.005 0.012 
 0.580 0.793 
0.176 0.020 
0.004*
* 0.385 
0.012* 0.330 
0.011* 0.708 0.449 0.016 
Labour regulations -0.009 0.006 -0.005 0.017 -0.016 0.010 -0.024 0.003 -0.015 0.008 0.001 0.017 
 0.458 0.692 0.441 0.003 0.065 0.148 0.014* 0.781 0.106 0.262 0.850 0.001 
Political instability -0.019 0.007 0.002 0.029 -0.021 0.004 -0.045 0.019 0.004 0.006 -0.014 0.019 
 0.150 0.634 0.827 0.004 0.039* 0.629 0.145 0.207 0.833 0.522 0.056 0.038 
Informal sector -0.029 -0.003 -0.006 0.007 -0.013 0.011 -0.017 0.015 -0.021 0.003 -0.009 0.006 
 0.002*
* 
0.747 
0.308 0.215 0.079 0.083 
0.046* 0.056 
0.035* 0.731 0.077 0.276 
Tax administration -0.004 -0.005 -0.026 0.010 -0.024 0.013 -0.042 0.014 0.010 0.011 -0.017 0.008 
 0.805 0.777 0.211 0.245 0.093 0.151 0.035* 0.276 0.645 0.408 0.183 0.333 
Tax rates -0.001 0.006 0.007 0.009 -0.040 0.008 -0.031 0.014 -0.011 0.004 0.000 0.011 
 0.965 0.615 
0.529 0.206 
0.002*
* 0.265 
0.046* 0.220 
0.426 0.628 0.999 0.100 
Transport -0.021 0.019 -0.015 0.002 -0.025 0.006 -0.053 0.004 -0.028 0.005 -0.009 0.007 
 0.108 0.212 0.041* 0.768 0.023* 0.348 0.00*** 0.688 0.020* 0.474 0.193 0.288 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
Source: Authors' estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
 
What about access to finance? 
 
Given the prominence of finance in the literature on 
MSMEs, it is fair to anticipate reservations to a conclusion 
that finance is not a top problem in South Africa. As 
Rogerson (2008) reviews, numerous studies argue that 
finance is the main problem for MSMEs in South Africa. 
The previous section finds limited evidence to substantiate 
such arguments. But comparing how the same firm rated 
access to finance in 2003 to how it rated the obstacle in 
2007, a decline in the financing constraint’s importance is 
observed thus possibly explaining the broadly insignificant 
effects. Figure 3 shows the shift towards ‘no obstacle’ for 
the matched panel set of 191 firms.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Access to finance 2003 vs. 2007 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa 
(2003; 2007) 
 
An important question arising from Figure 3 is whether the 
shift is a significant improvement in the perception of 
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finance accessibility. Comparing the mean ratings in the 
radar chart confirms that the improvement is significant with 
the null hypothesis of equal mean ratings in the two periods 
not being accepted (see Table 7). 
 
 
Table 7: Mean-comparison test (paired) for access to finance: 2003 vs. 2007 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
acess_03 191 1.2251 0.0955 1.3205 1.0367 1.4136 
acess_07 191 0.4450 0.0650 0.8979 0.3169 0.5732 
diff 191 0.7801 0.1151 1.5907 0.5531 1.0071 
mean(diff) = mean (acess_03 - acess_07)   t = 6.7777 
Ho: mean (diff) = 0    degrees of freedom = 190 
Ha: mean (diff) < 0  Ha: mean(diff)   0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2003; 2007) 
 
The 191 firms of course remained in business between 2003 
and 2007. But many studies have shown a high failure rate 
of MSMEs such that the panel set comparison is inherently 
biased in favour of resilient firms that would have survived 
obstacles such as access to finance. To offset the bias, a 
comparison of the mean rating of access to finance of firms 
surveyed in ‘2003 only’ to those surveyed in ‘2007 only’: 
412 firms in 2003 and 866 firms in 2007 is done. Table 8 
shows that 2007 ratings are better as the 95 percent 
confidence interval is well within the 2003 range. The 
difference is statistically significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
Table 8: Two-period review of the importance of access to finance importance 
 
Two sample t-test with Unequal variances of 2003 vs. 2007  
variable Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
acess_03 412 1.1384 0.0600 1.2174 1.0205 1.2562 
acess_07 866 0.8661 0.0428 1.2587 0.7821 0.9500 
combined 1278 0.9538 0.0350 1.2516 0.8852 1.0225 
diff  0.2723 0.0737  0.1277 0.4169 
 diff = mean(acess_03) - mean(acess_07)   t =   3.6964 
Ho: diff = 0  Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  832.999 
Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff ≠ 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9999    Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0002 Pr(T > t) = 0.0001 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2003; 2007) 
 
Firms that report access to finance as a problem would be 
expected to grow slower than those that say it is not. This 
comparison is made using both employment and sales 
growth measures. Table 9 presents the results of the 
comparison. There is no evidence in this study that firms 
reporting access to finance as a problem grow at a rate 
significantly different to those that rate access to finance as 
not an obstacle. So, this brief detour on the financing 
constraint in South Africa leads to two important 
conclusions: firstly that the perception of access and cost of 
finance improved between 2003 and 2007, and secondly that 
even though some firms report access to finance to be a 
problem in 2007, there is no evidence to suggest that their 
performance is affected by the problem. Although access to 
finance has been found to be a top constraint and binding 
constraint for growth of MSMEs elsewhere, MSMEs in 
South Africa seem to have other more serious problems. The 
inference from this review of the finance constraint in South 
Africa is that availability of finance has been improving. 
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Table 1: Performance of firms reporting finance as obstacle vs. those not 
 
Panel A: Employment growth 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
No obstacle 443 0.0763 0.0046 0.0971 0.0672 0.0853 
Obstacle 247 0.0876 0.0072 0.1156 0.0731 0.1021 
Combined 690 0.0803 0.0040 0.1042 0.0725 0.0881 
diff  -0.0114 0.0087  -0.0284 0.0057 
mean(diff) = mean (no obstacle - obstacle)   t = -1.3102 
Ho: mean (diff) = 0  Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom  = 439.987 
Ha: mean (diff) < 0  Ha: mean(diff)  0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0954     Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1908 Pr(T > t) = 0.9046 
 
Panel B: Sales growth 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
No obstacle 410 0.1127 0.0063 0.1275 0.1003 0.1251 
Obstacle 211 0.1350   0.0110 0.1602 0.1133 0.1568 
Combined   621   0.1203 0.0056 0.1398 0.1093 0.1313 
diff  -0.0223 0.0127    -0.0473 0.0027 
mean(diff) = mean (no obstacle - obstacle)   t = -1.7581  
Ho: mean (diff) = 0  Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom  = 350.118  
Ha: mean (diff) < 0  Ha: mean(diff)  0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0398    Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0796 Pr(T > t) = 0.9602 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
 
Implications for policy and research 
 
There are some enterprises where the impact of all obstacles 
on growth was below constraints with notable effects. The 
affected categories prior to interactions were micro, small, 
old, female-owned and European-owned, services and 
manufacturing sector, Cape Town, Durban and Port 
Elizabeth-based. There are two possible interpretations of 
this outcome. The first is that the firms have no significant 
obstacle constraining their growth, meaning that the 
business environment should be tenable for them. In this 
interpretation, firms are only exposed to the typical systemic 
challenges of being in enterprise, namely the ability to 
innovate and being competitive. The other interpretation is 
that there are omitted variables and, specifically, that the 
survey instrument may not have picked up important 
information from business owners that would have resulted 
in notable constraints being determined. This interpretation 
would call for more research to reassess the design of the 
survey instrument. Jointly, the interpretations bolster 
arguments for experimental support interventions to 
MSMEs where interventions that appear to deliver positive 
impact are scaled-up. In South Africa, such experimentation 
need not, for instance, emphasise finance in areas where 
finance is not a constraint.  
 
It is probably important to note that Dihn et al. (2010) find 
practices of informal competitors and access to finance as 
the most serious constraints but raise two arguments against 
the former. The first is by pointing out that the survey 
instrument lacks objective indicators to validate the 
constraint and the second is on the reasoning that 
competition, as the essence of enterprise, cannot be regarded 
as a constraint. In this light, ‘practices of informal 
competitors’ is a rather ambiguous constraint, as indeed is 
‘courts’. Courts relates to the legal system, its perceived and 
real efficiency4. This is too broad to relate to enterprise 
growth unless specific aspects of the law are explicitly given 
for evaluation by firms. Finding courts binding is of limited 
use to legal reform and design of support measures.  
 
One way of dealing with an ambiguous binding constraint 
such as courts is to opt for the second most serious on the 
basis of marginal effects on growth. This would certainly be 
justifiable in other contexts but for South Africa it is not, 
because it is plausible to associate courts with crime and 
crime is the top constraint on count-based methods. Indeed, 
on a count of significant obstacles in the second approach 
reported in Table 6, crime is the most serious obstacle. It is 
significant in 9 of the 14 interactions. The next important 
obstacles on the same count basis is practices of informal 
competitors with 7, customs and trade regulations and 
inadequately educated workers with 6 each, corruption with 
5 and the rest with 3 and under. So it is fair to conclude that 
crime is the binding constraint for MSMEs in South Africa 
and that the significant results of courts affirm this 
conclusion. It is also important to be cognisant of the 
possibility that the effects of some obstacles could be 
indirect. However, the question of how constraints relate 
and influence each other is beyond this paper but an 
important issue for further research. It would suffice for this 
discussion to postulate that a lax legal system increases 
                                           
4 World Bank Business Environment Surveys (1999-2000) did not have 
‘courts’ on the list but legal obstacles. 
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crime, limits entrepreneurship and keeps stakeholder such as 
insurance companies away.    
 
This paper used the 2007 Enterprise Survey data. In 
preparation for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, 
substantial infrastructure projects to improve the transport 
system and electricity supply were undertaken nationally. It 
is likely that the relative importance of some obstacles may 
have changed because of these projects and other policies 
since then. A larger follow-up survey would be invaluable 
as it would show the evolving issues of MSME growth and 
further enrich debates on the economic impact of such 
investments and events (Rogerson, 2009). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The paper identified key constraints to the growth of 
MSMEs and determined the most binding one. A criterion 
for identifying top constraints was presented as an 
alternative to the simple count of responses approach often 
used in the literature. Using the alternative, crime, electricity 
and corruption are found to be the top constraints. Firms 
were grouped by size, age, sector, ethnic and gender 
ownership and location to determine key constraints for 
each group. The binding constraint for MSMEs as a whole is 
crime. Electricity and transportation of goods are constraints 
with notable effects on growth. Access to finance has 
limited effects on most MSMEs and a closer review 
suggests that access has improved over time.  
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